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WIRA - 422

KAPOK [] 1925

3 April 1952.

To : Washington .

From : []

Subject - General : Plan CHARITY

- Specific : Establishment of Direct Contact with []

*Indefinite
17 Apr 52. JH*

A. Considerations Leading to Direct Contact with []

1. On 26 February 1952, at his own request, [] was presented to [] (in Rome to take part in BKI's Party Congress) by DECADAL. From the point of view of immediate and long-range utility this step was undertaken for the following principal reasons:
 - a) In order to salvage the morale and potential value of an agent who had been more or less abandoned to his own devices in Senigallia by his Albanian operational-political leaders as well as by the [] service. []'s project to send him to Trieste to aid "Investigazioni Navali" operative CARRASI in attempting to contact crew members of Albanian vessels calling there having fallen through (because [] was unable to obtain necessary personal documentation for []), no plans to make use of [] were forthcoming. As to []'s capabilities there could be little doubt: []'s recommendations as to his prestige and influence in his region of Albania, []'s warm praise for his general diligence, willingness and seriousness of purpose, and his technical capabilities as a w/t operator had been fully confirmed by the COKU-SYNCH interest in availing themselves of his services.
 - b) To build up a reliable agent to serve as a control over BKI leaders whose activities and views as presented to us, undoubtedly

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in all sincerity and honesty, do not necessarily meet with the full approval of their rank and file.

- c) In order to be informed of any unilateral plans [] might have to make use of []'s services without informing us.
- d) In order to have a trustworthy, independent agent capable of carrying out a general CE assignment regarding activities of local compatriots in the event it will be possible to have him transferred to Rome. This aspect of his projected use is considered necessary chiefly to fill the lacuna represented by BKI's deplorable lack of interest and capabilities along those lines. It is believed, for example, that []'s presence in Rome would soon permit us to tape the activities of Mentor COKU who has obviously not gone into hibernation since the recent blowing of his activities on behalf of SYNCH.

2. Security wise the decision to establish the direct contact was conditioned by several factors, among them []'s verbal report of some six-eight weeks ago to the effect that relations between [] and [] were none too good, and DECADAL's indications that he had unwillingly, and to no useful purpose, become the person to whom [] was avoiding both his Albanian leaders and []'s office, came for advice. The decision was also influenced by DECADAL's assurances that []'s own reliability and sense of security are such as to insure that the latter would never reveal the contact to either his compatriot leaders or to members of []'s service. In this connection, at subsequent meetings, it was impressed on [] that our security demands apply equally to DECADAL.

B. []'s Relations with BKI Leaders.

3. A detailed sounding of []'s views concerning BKI and its leaders has not been made thus far. In general, however, it can be stated that he has the highest respect for [] whom he regards as BKI's mainstay and one of the very few genuine Albanian representatives in exile. He is aware of []'s faults and weaknesses but recognizes the importance and necessity of the latter's role as his Party's political adviser and its literate and articulate voice. [] does accuse him, however, of giving too little heed to the necessity of cultivating and aiding the Party's lower strata of membership.
4. []'s heaviest criticism, however, is directed against [].

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who he states, has not shouldered the responsibilities of his Party position, but has allowed himself to become the figurehead in whose name [] speaks and acts. [] is particularly galled by []'s apparent lack of interest in the activities and welfare of the men who constitute his pool of potential recruits for operational use. In this connection he cites the case of twelve men at Lavrion Camp, Greece, who report that they have written to [] for advice on numerous occasions without ever having received a reply (this matter will be the subject of a separate report).

5. On the personal level []'s regard of [] is extremely low, though he expresses his opinions with a remarkable lack of bitterness. "Outside our country", he remarks, "we do not wear the fez, but []'s surrender of the family trousers to his Italian wife is carrying westernization too far". Coming closer to home, [] confirmed an earlier [] report to []: before []'s departure on his last mission (i.e., late 1949 - early 1950), he and other CHARITY agents then in Italy, took up a collection of some 150,000 lire to be sent to []'s father who was living in Syria. This sum was entrusted to [] for forwarding, but never reached its destination. A satisfactory explanation has never been furnished [], though about one-half the amount in question has been returned to him in minute and infrequent installments. A later disagreeable incident took place when BKI failed to make [] a promised 20,000 lire payment as reimbursement for his extraordinary expenses in attending the Party's recent Rome Congress.
6. Summing up, [] states that BKI, despite its weaknesses, is by far the soundest of all Albanian exile political organizations, and its program expresses his own line of political thinking. In any case, he avers, he would not leave the Party: "Once I've given my word I'm with them to the end".

C. []'s Relations with []'s Service.

7. []'s contacts with the [] service are now limited almost exclusively to occasional meetings with [] for whom he has a certain affection, but an utter lack of respect. [] he states, is gossipy, insecure, did not protect the interests of the agents in his charge because of his excessive fear of his superiors, and "knocked down" too much on ration funds of the CHARITY training and staging areas under his control (at one point the entire CHARITY group threatened to stage a mass protest to bring their utterly inadequate ration situation to the attention of Battista FIENGA). [] also accuses him

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of laziness: after some months of training at [] hands plus considerable practice on his own, []'s w/t sending and receiving abilities surpassed those of his teacher () has stated to [] that () is "almost as good an operator as I", and at that point he became CHARITY's w/t instructor.

8. [] has never had any hesitation in allowing CHARITY agents to know of AIS sponsorship of the operation, and has frequently made gratuitous mention of "Signor _____" ([]'s first name) to []. When the latter visited [] some weeks ago he was told that [] was preparing to leave his Rome assignment, and that his replacement had already arrived.
9. [] expresses no opinions concerning the higher echelons of []'s service (he is only casually acquainted with []) other than to state it probably fits the pattern of all Italian services. After SYNCH experience his regard of the latter is not high: "We could have dragged heavy artillery and tanks through Rome and nobody would have been the wiser".

D. Current Situation .

10. Four meetings, subsequent to the initial one, have been held with [] thus far. They were largely taken up by a thorough debriefing concerning his activities on behalf of local SYNCH operations, which will be the subject of a separate report. [] was also consulted as to his views regarding the best available cover for his coming to Rome in order to begin his assignment as an independent agent. It was agreed that he should write to [] and to [] proposing that he be transferred to Rome in order to undergo advanced w/t training with a view to obtaining an international operators license. Two letters to [] and one to [] containing this suggestion have gone unanswered. []'s subsequent verbal inquiries have elicited the most noncommittal reaction. [] answered in effect, "We'll see, we'll see", whereas [], expressing doubt that the proposal would meet with []'s approval (it was on that occasion that he informed [] of []'s apocryphal transfer), has not so far even mentioned the matter to his immediate chief, []. To date, unfortunately, []'s proposal has not been revealed to [] by either [] or [] and it may be necessary to have the matter brought up with [] by DECADAL in []'s presence.
11. A complete personal history statement will be obtained and submitted.

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